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1. Introduction 
The international human rights regime has undergone extraordinary expansion in the last 
thirty years, evident in an increasingly sophisticated framework of treaties, networks, 
institutions, and ambitious standards.  Now widely regarded as a core component of 
interstate and transnational global affairs, few international relations (IR) scholars anticipated 
the contemporary reach of human rights.1 The transformative potential of an increasingly 
intrusive human rights architecture should not be underestimated.  However, concerns 
persist regarding the disjuncture between human rights system rules and practices on the 
ground.  This ‘compliance gap’ is exacerbated by the relative absence of implementation 
arrangements authorised to enforce a global human rights governance agenda. 
 
The terms of this debate in IR reflect the limitations of a discipline which has only recently 
extended its gaze beyond interstate relations. IR scholars have struggled to accommodate 
multiple scales of actors, authority structures, and societal conditions into their explanatory 
frameworks.  As such, human rights scholarship has only lately engaged with key empirical 
questions on governance in this issue-area. 2  A more problem-oriented scholarship on 
international organisations (IGOs) and global governance offers a promising point of 
departure for evaluating the interactions and effects of increasingly dense IGO ecologies in 
the area of human rights.3  
 
Global governance scholarship has begun to explore these trends broadly, using the 
concept of ‘governance architecture’, defined as ‘the overarching system of public and 
private institutions that are valid or active in a given issue area in world politics’. 4   In 
analyzing the presence or (more often) the absence of integrated global architecture – 
incorporating regimes, institutions and their component agents, structures norms and 
procedures – scholars have generated significant insights into the impact of institutional 
complexes, overlaps and interlinkages, on governance outcomes across diverse issue-
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areas.5 This scholarship has made important advances in terms of explicating architectures, 
making legible what may at first glance seem to be quite incoherent and disparate elements.  
However, much less is known about the actual effects of global architectures, with the jury 
still out on the relative merits of integration versus fragmentation and, crucially, when and 
why global structures matter for closing compliance gaps on the ground.6 
 
This concern is particularly acute in the domain of global human rights governance.  As this 
study highlights, the global human rights architecture is highly articulated, notable for its 
profusion of non-state actors and levels of formal linkages across levels of governance.  A 
large rationalist literature on the mechanics of the human rights architecture suggests that 
differential structural configurations can generate powerful instrumental effects on state 
behaviour and governance outcomes. 7  However, other observers caution that such 
rationalist claims are often not borne out by the evidence.8 In particular, they highlight the 
importance of agency and political contestation in understanding outcomes which deviate 
from formal models, especially as we engage the question of compliance gaps in domestic 
jurisdictions. 9  Taking the issue-area of global human rights governance, this study 
distinguishes between two central questions: how to best delineate and describe analytically 
the global actors, processes and structures in this domain and their interactions?  When and 
why does the global human rights architecture actually matter for human rights outcomes?  
The predominant focus of this article is on the first question, but with a view to exploring the 
analytical distinction between structure and effects for advancing explanatory research on 
the efficacy of global structures. 
 
The notion of a governance ‘architecture’ is adopted here as a heuristic lens capable of 
accommodating both a rationalist concern for structure and its potential effects on 
(principally instrumental) behaviour of governance actors, as well as a relationship-based 
analysis of ‘global governors’ and the interactional effects of political units within authorising 
structures.  Both accounts provide the coordinates for deepening conceptual and theoretical 
understandings of global governance.  However, both display limitations. The instrumental 
account tends to privilege structural properties and instrumental rationales focused on 
resource competition, while screening out agency and political conflict.  The relational 
account, with its emphasis on synergies and tensions among governing actors, while 
instructive, does not necessarily translate into a specified analytical framework. 
 
This article seeks to specify analytically a governance architecture from the global to the 
local level within an issue-specific governance domain.  A methodological nationalism in 
much of the IR literature, tending towards arbitrary segmentation of political arenas, has 
hampered efforts to engage questions of multi-level governance and compliance. 10  A 
particularly promising advance towards a unified theory of (global) governance can be found 
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in the work of Abbott and colleagues on orchestration.11 This theory builds upon a large body 
of work in the field of new governance in public administration and transnationalism to 
develop a general theory of governance, with application across political units, as well as 
scales of governance.  Distinct from principal-agent models of governance, orchestration 
applies when a focal actor (the orchestrator) enlists and supports third-party actors (the 
intermediary) to address the target in pursuit of shared governance objectives.  It occurs 
when three conditions are met: (1) the orchestrator seeks to influence the behaviour of the 
target indirectly via intermediaries, and (2) the orchestrator does not exercise control over 
the intermediary, which, in turn, (3) cannot compel compliance of the target.12 
 
I use the example of the United Nations torture prevention architecture, as established by 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT), to explore the utility of 
orchestration theory in generating insight into a new generation of global human rights 
architecture.13  It finds that orchestration provides a powerful toolkit for robust relational 
specification of actors and linkages across levels of analysis.  Beyond this analytical 
descriptive task, the article also probes the claim that orchestration arrangements can 
enhance the compliance objectives of the OPCAT architecture: eradicating the practice of 
torture in domestic jurisdictions.  Placing particular emphasis on successful enlistment of 
local actors into global governance programmes, it explores the premise that orchestration is 
more likely to secure compliance where governance rule systems are formally articulated in 
a global architecture and there is goal convergence among political units.  I use the former 
concept to refer to the stabilising properties of structural and normative overlaps, and the 
latter to evaluate how goal convergence between global governance programmes and 
domestic pro-compliance actors reinforces or undermines compliance.  In so doing, the 
article further highlights the limitations of an orchestration frame premised on voluntary 
participation for understanding the actual efficacy of the OPCAT architecture in closing the 
compliance gap. 
 
Importantly, the article also illustrates an extension of the orchestration arrangement to the 
domestic level, observing role alternation among orchestrators, intermediaries and targets.  
This builds upon the Abbott et al. observation that orchestration ‘may define the entire chain 
of governance relationships’.14 In contrast to a linear relational model, this article presents 
four possible dynamics, with important implications for compliance: simple orchestration 
(goals aligned across political units), competitive orchestration (goals between orchestrator 
and intermediary aligned, but may compete for finite resources), cascade orchestration (civil 
society pressure on target to comply, even absent a relationship with the orchestrator), and 
reverse orchestration (target instrumentalizes the intermediary to influence the orchestrator).  
This exploratory exercise captures a contemporary climate of dispersed authority, directing 
our attention away from structure to the close interrelation between material power and 
coordination capacity of diverse governance actors.  Orchestration theory can serve to 
usefully frame the OPCAT strategic environment and accommodate the possibility of 
unintended consequences.  It offers less insight, however, into those factors which are likely 
to determine such political outcomes.  As outlined here, additional analytical tools are likely 
required to advance an explanatory agenda of how global arrangements transform the 
domestic politics of compliance. 
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This article begins by evaluating the idea of global human rights governance and 
architecture, before turning to the application of orchestration theory.  Using the torture 
prevention regime as an example, it outlines how articulation of global architecture has 
begun to reconfigure relationships among key governance actors. It explores the interaction 
between two core political units (orchestrator and intermediary), with a focus on formal 
articulation of their governing relationship as well as goal convergence.  The potential 
implications for the efficacy of the OPCAT architecture are explored.  The article concludes 
by highlighting what the analysis means for human rights and global governance research 
more generally. 
 
2. Bridging gaps: global human rights governance 
Global human rights governance bears the hallmarks of Rosenau’s dictum on ‘governance 
without government’, 15  displaying multiplying forms and structures of authority, regime 
complexity, actor proliferation and, importantly, the capacity for transformation.  States 
remain prominent within human rights governance.  However, the exercise and effects of 
state power in this domain are undergoing significant change, informed by emergent forms 
of private and hybrid authority. This trend has been documented in a large body of 
interdisciplinary work offering micro and macro accounts of the origins of international 
human rights regimes and the gradual ceding of delegated authority by state parties to 
independent structures and agents at both the domestic and global level.16 
 
However, often disparate actors, arenas and mechanisms of influence have been 
considered in isolation or as dichotomous.  This is symptomatic of a more general trend in IR 
which has tended to isolate component parts of the global governance whole.  The 
importance of organisational environment has frequently been bracketed outside the 
analytical frame or disregarded altogether. It is only recently that scholars have begun to 
apply a broader view to global governance phenomena.  In part, this is a response to denser 
organisational ecologies and functional complexity at the international level, combined with 
growing uncertainty around causal relationships.  Scholars have employed a range of 
exploratory conceptual frameworks to open up exploration of system-level trends across 
global governance arenas.17 
 
Our understanding of how the human rights organisational environment ‘hangs together’ 
remains under-specified, with potentially important implications also for understanding the 
efficacy of global structures.  A lively prescriptive debate has focused on the overall 
influence of the international human rights regime, with studies arriving at conflicting 
conclusions.18 One possibility is that conflicting patterns stem more from a paucity of data 
and limited understanding of the many steps which separate international instruments from 
practices on the ground than from any methodological proclivities.  Making legible the 
governance ontological whole beyond the state is therefore particularly important.  As David 
Lake has written, ‘[t]he distinction between domestic and international politics as now 
construed is untenable...We ought to be seeking a unified theory of governance, not 
artificially segmenting realms of politics by arbitrary assumptions’.19  
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As many authors have remarked, human rights unlike international trade and security, do not 
privilege the interests of the authorising principal, but rather the individuals at risk of abuse 
by those same contracting principals. 20  As such, traditional interstate mechanisms that 
explain compliance in other fields, such as reciprocity and retaliation, have limited 
application.  Realist scholars have dismissed human rights as merely an artifice of powerful 
state interests.  However, an empirically-driven research agenda on international diffusion 
and domestic mobilisation effects has decisively problematised such claims.21 The general 
absence of interstate enforcement has opened up fruitful, methodologically plural inquiry into 
a diverse range of regulatory logics and identification of new authority structures at the sub-
state, domestic and transnational level.22 Explaining why some international human rights 
norms are effective in some contexts but not in others has proven more problematic for 
rationalist frameworks.  Some scholars have turned to theories of transnational and domestic 
pro-compliance mobilisation and political contestation for answers.23 This is a necessary 
step towards reasserting the close interrelation between material power and the coordination 
capacity of non-state actors, an issue often neglected by constructivists.  Another strand of 
research highlights the range of delegated authority within IGO structures and the ability of 
sub-state and IGO entrepreneurs to pursue governance goals at the limits of, or beyond, 
state agreement.24  
 
In effect, we are witnessing a dispersion of authority at all levels of human rights 
governance.  However, our understanding of the analytically distinct but related issues of 
how political units are integrated and interact within the global whole, and, crucially, with 
what effect, remains partial.  To overcome this explanatory deficit, it is necessary to reassert 
the presence of politics and power in global human rights governance.  As Avant et al. note, 
scholars ‘rarely talk about global governors’.25 We might add that scholars rarely talk about 
domestic politics and power.  Global human rights governance is a particularly instructive 
realm in which to engage such concerns, given its radical intent as a ‘power mediator’: 
whereby it seeks to empower materially weak actors in asymmetric power relationships 
irrespective of territorial boundaries. 26  This is not the place for extended conceptual 
discussion of how a global governance conceptualisation may encapsulate such a radical 
humanist project.  Suffice to say, we must be awake to the potential objectification of ‘global 
governance’ as a mask for ideological agendas.27 In this sense, a further pending empirical 
task involves inquiring into global human rights architecture and the key political question: 
How are these regulatory governance arrangements connected to power structures: whose 
interests are being protected, and whose values promoted? 
 
2.1.  Conceptualising global human rights architecture 
What is ‘global’ in global human rights architecture?  Beyond the existence of an institutional 
apparatus above the nation state, Zürn advances two additional conditions as representative 
of global governance: (1) the global level must be autonomous, with evidence of delegation 
of power to realms outside state structures (or, more specifically, national executives), and 
(2) the global level must form part of an interactive system, as opposed to a segmented level 
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operating independent of the whole.28 There must be, in Zürn’s words, some indication of 
‘functional’ or ‘stratified’ differentiation.  An expansive human rights architecture meets both 
criteria, with significant governance functions (rule-making, stewardship, advocacy, 
accountability, monitoring, and coordination) delegated to a range of authorities, from IGOs, 
to civil society and sub-state units.  However, it is material to note that states (or more 
accurately, certain governmental actors) retain significant control over core governance 
functions, the most visible of which are resource allocation and implementation.  In turn, 
articulation of actors and functions along linked chains of governance is evident. 
 
The international human rights regime is relatively integrated, with an apex rule-making 
body, the Human Rights Council (HRC), located in Geneva.  This body is supported by the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as a phalanx of 
auxiliary bureaucratic structures and agencies.  Much of this international machinery has 
emerged or been strengthened since the early 1990s in the wake of an operational shift 
towards implementation at the national level.29 In turn, there has been significant expansion 
of regional-level rule-making regimes, most notably in Europe and Latin America, but also 
emergent in Africa and the Asia-Pacific.30 However, governance relationships between the 
global and the local societal level have remained largely segmented, mediated by state 
authority and a selective group of transnational actors.  As Zürn notes, there is a pressing 
need ‘to legitimate decisions more directly in order to make the two-step authority 
relationship viable’. 31  The new OPCAT architecture described below represents an 
organisational response to this major deficit. 
 
A focus on architecture to explore global human rights governance is intuitively appealing.  
The language of design provides a reassuring sense of structure to often highly 
decentralised, loosely coupled realms of politics.  From a functionalist perspective, 
architecture provides a platform upon which to build more effective and efficient governance 
arrangements.  Guided by the concepts of subsidiarity (decisions should be made at as local 
a level as possible) and irreducibility (certain problems can only be addressed at the global 
level), rationalist scholarship emphasises the importance of limiting negative externalities of 
decentralised action, efficiency gains through coordination, and functional differentiation.32 
To achieve these objectives, they advocate effective management of participating states 
through the employment of material incentives and sanctions to reduce transaction costs 
and secure credible commitments.  However, too often, rationalists reify interests in their 
explanatory frameworks and underplay or neglect altogether the role of legitimacy in 
determining the preferences of political units within authorizing structures.33  
 
Observing legitimacy mechanisms poses a methodological challenge.  Nevertheless, given 
the relative absence of hierarchical control at the international level, coupled with prevalent 
democratic deficits, legitimate authority may be the crucial additive to achieving cooperation 
and regulation.  An alternative critique of architecture questions the attempt to render social 
relationships as ‘permanent, functional, and indeed perhaps beyond rational reproach’.34 It is 
important not to exaggerate claims of interlocking global, regional or local structures.  In 
practice, there are few examples of (effective) apex institutions in global human rights.  
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Authority is routinely contested and formal articulation of rule systems in structure remains 
emergent.  In an explicitly normative governance regime such as human rights, this raises 
important questions of scope and boundary.   Who are the legitimate stewards? Where does 
their scope of action begin and end, and what is the basis of their authority?  Any durable 
human rights architecture must be based not only on procedural obligation, but also on the 
conflictual politics of authority among both the governors and the governed. 
 
A more precise use of the architecture concept can illuminate the structures and political 
units which serve as both venues for decision-making and agents for action within multi-
actor governance systems.  This contrasts with Biermann et al.’s expansive view of 
architecture as the ‘meta-level of governance’, which incorporates within its purview multiple 
regimes, institutions and all of their component elements.35 The approach adopted here 
reflects an interest in magnifying how governance rule-systems are purposively articulated 
within issue-specific domains.  Architecture reflects not just legal form but also normative 
and political understandings and expectations.  Rather than simply being the aggregation of 
formal rules and structure, it is also composed of political units with diverse interests.  Close 
attention must therefore be given to how these political units are integrated.  As Mugge 
notes, ‘assessments of legitimacy have to focus on the actual workings of institutions, not on 
formal flows of authority, information and accountability’.36  
 
This insight raises the empirical question: to what extent can particular configurations of 
global architecture actually enable (or disable) pro-compliance actors to advance their 
governance objectives?  Put even more bluntly, to what effect do global rule frameworks 
actually influence compliance outcomes?  In this regard, analysts may focus on formal 
safeguards of independence, representation, and equity.  On a normative level, the question 
speaks to a fundamental paradox in the human rights enterprise: principal moral hazard.  As 
Rennger cautions, ‘it is an obvious fact that in order to [advance the human rights agenda] 
we have to give states and other agents more power, not less’.37 However, in light of this 
fact, it is also important to acknowledge that states are not unitary actors, but are made up of 
multiple sub-state units whose preferences may deviate from those of government.  This is 
particularly apparent in global human rights governance where sub-state units are often 
subject to dual delegation, whereby states have simultaneously delegated to international 
organisations and to sub-state actors.38 As such, a key task for analysts is to evaluate 
preference ordering among sub-state units within global human rights governance chains 
and goal convergence among functionally differentiated governance actors. 
 
Architecture further conveys the notion of normative standards imprinted onto actual 
structures and, more controversially, practices.  The articulation of global governance 
structures to the local level encapsulates ongoing efforts to ‘work human rights into the 
cracks of international society’.39 From a functionalist perspective, it marks a shift from rule-
making to rule-implementation, with the ex-post costs of rule recognition raised through the 
installation of dedicated agents with sufficient autonomy and power to advance global rule 
systems locally.  It also reflects a differentiation of authority and functions, extending from 
collective principals (states) to first, second and potentially multiple-tier governance agents.  
This may have significant implications for both the legitimacy and performance of 
governance architecture.  Additional locations for coordination of policies may enhance 
performance.  However, as global governance chains become extended to domestic 
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jurisdictions, questions of legitimate authority, representation, and political contestation are 
likely to intervene.  In the absence of a direct relationship between global structures and the 
intended beneficiaries (or governed), architecture which does not display a capacity to 
accommodate political contestation is unlikely to achieve the desired outcome.40 
 
This is well-illustrated by interrogating a prevalent assumption in the functionalist literature 
regarding informational effects of international instruments at the domestic level.41 More 
information is assumed to enhance coordination.  However, less attention is generally paid 
to those conditions under which information becomes powerful. As Johnston puts it, there is 
a potential ‘infinite regress problem’ in establishing the credibility of information at or in any 
given place.42 Explaining the local impact of information necessitates attention not only to 
coordination, but also to the legitimate authority and power of the messenger(s) and its 
distributional implications for competing domestic political forces.  The ability of global 
governors to steward governance processes in local contexts, especially those defined by 
high levels of rule contestation, will be reliant upon convergence between the objectives of 
global governors and those of domestic pro-compliance supporting coalitions willing and 
able to engage in the often costly (sometimes dangerous) politics of social change.  
Evaluating the relationship between political units within global governance architectures is 
therefore essential to understanding outcomes. 
 
3. Orchestrating global human rights governance 
In order to generate insight into the interplay of political units within a multi-scale governance 
architecture, this article employs orchestration theory.43 Orchestration can be defined as 
when a governance actor (the orchestrator) enlists and supports third-party actors (the 
intermediary) to address (the target) indirectly in pursuit of shared governance objectives.  
As a descriptive analytical theory, it displays a number of general application merits, 
specifying types of actors, their governance relationships, and the scope for governance 
mobilisation in light of prevailing problem structures and strategic environments.  It is 
important, however, not to conflate opportunity space under conditions of orchestration with 
compliance action on the part of the agent.  As developed here, orchestration theory 
represents an important advance on formalist scholarship in terms of theorising global 
governance domains as strategic social environments.  However, it may offer less 
explanatory insight into the actual compliance effects of global governance programmes on 
the ground. 
 
Orchestration theory responds to system-level trends in global governance which mirror, to 
some extent, the new governance model of regulation widely applied to domestic 
jurisdictions.44 Contexts of regime complexity, functional decentralisation to private actors 
and a shift away from directly enforceable regulation have opened up new modalities of 
governance to a range of non-state actors and institutions.  In contrast to hierarchy and 
delegation, orchestration is not premised on contractual obligation, but rather on voluntary 
participation within multi-actor systems.  It holds when three conditions are met: (1) the 
orchestrator seeks to influence the behaviour of the target via intermediaries, (2) the 
orchestrator does not exercise control over the intermediary, which, in turn, (3) cannot 
compel compliance of the target. In a departure from principal-agent frameworks which 
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emphasises direct command and control of the agent, the orchestration model highlights 
influence exercised indirectly and via non-binding instruments.  A burgeoning empirical 
literature demonstrates that orchestration is widely used by both IGOs and other governance 
actors in pursuit of governance goals across a range of issue areas, including human 
rights.45 
 
Orchestration is particularly well-suited to theorising the problem structure thrown up by 
human rights governance.  Concretely, the strategic environment of the UN human rights 
regime confirms the hypotheses advanced by Abbott et al. that IGO-led orchestration is 
more likely to occur under conditions of: (1) high goal divergence among principals and/or 
between principals and the agent, (2) capability deficits on the part of the IGO, (3) weak 
principal oversight and institutional control mechanisms, (4) and availability of third-party 
intermediaries.  Study of the human rights domain also highlights a fifth hypothesis: an 
expansive and non-restrictive rule framework.  We might add that these factors may also be 
applicable to other actors and levels of analysis, including sub-state agencies operating 
within domestic political systems.  This theoretical toolkit provides a valuable platform to 
delineate and describe analytically the global human rights governance domain.  Importantly, 
it also opens up inquiry into opportunity space and the ability of strategic actors to leverage a 
margin of independent action beyond state agreement.   
 
Orchestration overcomes some of the ontological and political limitations of governance 
frameworks which emphasise cooperation without due regard for the difficulties and 
normative dilemmas inherent in governing human rights via direct supranational intervention.  
As illustrated below, an orchestration approach can illuminate the diversity of means, motive 
and opportunities available to pro-compliance actors seeking to pursue shared governance 
objectives within a global human rights architecture.  In this sense, it serves as a basis for a 
more grounded explanatory agenda on the transnational factors which shape the efficacy of 
global governance programmes.  Implicit in the conditional factors underpinning IGO-led 
orchestration is a deeply political project, whereby the relative power of diverse actors 
(orchestrator, intermediary and, above all, the target), their respective material capabilities, 
and ideational authority at the local level will have a powerful bearing on outcomes.  
Orchestration theory offers a window onto an underappreciated mode of human rights 
governance, but its emphasis on informational advantage, institutional control mechanisms, 
correlation of goals and complementary capabilities, while highly suggestive, can only 
provide partial insight into the political contest which informs compliance outcomes. 
 
As such, it is important to also insert power and politics into this framework.  The ability of an 
IGO orchestrator to enlist local pro-compliance actors has potentially significant power 
implications.  However, it does not, by itself, offer a compelling explanatory theory for the 
success or failure of such governance innovations, which will ultimately be reliant upon the 
transformation of domestic politics.  Actual implementation of human rights standards is 
contingent on a host of factors, likely requiring a transnational theory of political 
transformation.46 Related to this, the idea of consent-based governance underspecifies the 
potential for coercion.  Orchestrators may not be as reliant upon voluntary consent as the 
model presupposes, with material and ideational inducements serving also as top-down 
mechanisms to influence, sanction and potentially exclude local actors whose ideas run 
counter to prescriptive global governance programmes.  As the next section probes further, 
such considerations provide the fundamental coordinates for deepening understanding of 
how, when and why orchestrating actors actually generate compliance. 
                                                 
45
 See Abbott et al., International Organizations as Orchestrators; Thomas Pegram, ‘Global human 
rights governance and orchestration: national human rights institutions as intermediaries’, European 
Journal of International Relations, forthcoming. 
46
 For an instructive discussion on this point see Greg Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and 
State Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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GLOBAL 
SYSTEM SPT 
Intermediary NPM 
LOCAL 
SYSTEM Sub-Intermediary 
Executive Target Executive 
 
3.1.  Orchestrating chains of governance in torture prevention  
Scholars have produced valuable insight into the origins of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture regime.47 However, the significance of this new class of treaty 
regime is still under-theorised and not well understood.  Orchestration theory highlights the 
agentic elements of this unusually articulated architecture, while also making legible the 
chain of governance relationships from the global to the local.  As Figure 1 illustrates, the 
formal linkages of the OPCAT architecture map relatively straightforwardly onto this 
analytical framework, allowing for exploration of the articulation of structures and 
relationships within a unified governance architecture and its effects.  
 
Figure 1: Multi-scale torture prevention governance through orchestration 
 
       Model A                                   Model B 
 
   Orchestrator           
 
 
    
   Intermediary 
 
               
 
 
       Target 
 
According to model A, the UN Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT) is the 
Orchestrator seeking to influence the Target: national executives.  Bridging the two is the 
Intermediary: National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs). Importantly, orchestration theory 
also allows us to extend the chain of governance to the national and sub-national level, as 
illustrated in Model B.  Here the intermediary also enlists further Sub-Intermediaries or Pro-
Compliance Actors (PCAs), including sub-state and civil society constituents.  The model 
opens up inquiry into alternating roles within the governance architecture, with the 
intermediary potentially assuming an orchestrator function at the local level.  The model also 
highlights how similar factors may encourage coordinated action along the entire 
governance chains.  As such, orchestration offers the promise of a unified theory of 
governance.   
 
When applied to the specific issue of torture prevention, orchestration can assist in directing 
our attention to key structural aspects of the underlying strategic environment.  This type of 
human rights violation displays a particular problem structure, the pathologies of which are 
likely to have a powerful bearing on any potential solution.  The hypotheses advanced by 
Abbott et al. can serve to explain variations in orchestration in this domain.  For example, 
principal moral hazard is severe, given that torture violations generally implicate either 
directly or indirectly the state (or state actors) as the responsible party.  As such, this type of 
violation is likely to feature high goal divergence among principals (some of which may 
credibly commit) as well as between principals and their agent.  The high probability of 
principal moral hazard, counter-intuitively, may also lead to weaker formal oversight as 
states intentionally insulate the agent in order to enhance credibility.  Coupled with the fact 
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that human rights is generally not associated with the ‘high politics’ of security or trade and 
therefore not subject to strict intergovernmental management, the conditions for IGO-led 
orchestration to arise are in place. 
 
If principal moral hazard is a concern at the international level, it becomes acute within 
domestic political systems where multiple state officials may have a strong interest in 
evading or obstructing compliance.  It is perhaps unsurprising that systematic data on torture 
incidence is extremely difficult to collect or verify. Given their own capability deficits, IGOs 
are heavily reliant upon local actors for implementation of a torture prevention programme, 
as well as assessment of its efficacy.  As such, IGOs may achieve efficiency-gains through 
successful enlistment of intermediaries (Model A).  However, as the action moves to the 
domestic level (Model B), the actual effects of IGO-led orchestration are likely to be highly 
dependent upon a host of local political conditions.  As developed here in relation to the UN 
torture prevention regime, this may result in outcomes which are starkly different to those 
predicted in the formal model or those intended by the orchestrator. 
 
A. The Orchestrator 
The SPT is the OPCAT focal actor within UN structures charged with closing the compliance 
gap between rule-authority and rule-implementation.  Nominally a sub-committee to the long-
standing Committee Against Torture (CAT),48 the SPT forms part of an integrated torture 
prevention regime but is more accurately understood as a free-standing monitoring body 
rather than as a subsidiary to the CAT.49 The OPCAT seeks to imprint a proscriptive rule 
framework in a global system of inspection of places of detention coordinated by an 
international body of independent experts.  Establishing no new norms or standards, OPCAT 
is instead focused on implementing a well-established normative framework prohibiting 
torture through innovative procedural obligations.50 For the architects of OPCAT, the SPT 
forms the centre-piece of a novel legalisation of human rights architecture which obliges 
states to recognise the jurisdiction of a global monitoring structure, as well as an analogous 
domestic structure (Model A, Figure 1). 
 
As a political unit, the SPT comprises 25 independent experts who are appointed by state 
parties to the Protocol, but serve in their personal capacity for a four-year term, renewable 
once.51 In contrast to other treaty bodies, OPCAT seeks to limit state oversight by explicitly 
setting down independence and impartiality criteria for membership.52 The Convention also 
requires equitable geographical and gender representation on the subcommittee.53 The vast 
majority of SPT members display significant expertise and are generally viewed as 
credible.54 However, the presence of two current government officials on the SPT is cause 
for concern.55 Perception of independence is vital to the legitimate authority of the SPT.  It 
must guard against actual or perceived instrumentalization by state parties.  Countervailing 
background norms are also apparent in the final OPCAT text which may exert a conservative 
pull on the appropriate scope of SPT orchestration activities.56 
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The SPT self-identifies as ‘a new generation of United Nations treaty body with a unique 
mandate’.57 The SPT performs three core tasks, to: (1) conduct country-visits in places of 
deprivation of liberty, (2) coordinate the work of NPMs, and (3) cooperate with other UN and 
regional organisations.58 Unlike all other treaty bodies, it undertakes field visits rather than 
considering state reports or individual communications.  It therefore proactively engages in 
information gathering and monitoring activities to arrive at an independent assessment of 
state compliance with their obligations.  In effect, the SPT exercises a police patrol form of 
accountability mandated to: (1) establish a programme of regular visits, (2) choose the 
places it wants to visit, and (3) propose follow-up visits.59  States are required to receive the 
SPT and grant it unrestricted access on its territory without prior consent.60 This is a sea-
change from the oversight, subject to state consent, exercised by the CAT inquiry procedure 
or the UN independent expert or ‘special procedure’ on torture.61 Whereas the authority of 
the CAT is located mainly in its rule-making function, that of the SPT can be traced to its 
rule-implementation prerogatives.62 As one member puts it: 
 
The promise of the SPT is that it is the largest UN human rights treaty body, which 
goes to the field and is part of an official system with a constellation of national 
bodies, given legitimacy by an international treaty.63 
 
It is important to note that the SPT is the product of intergovernmental negotiation.  This is 
apparent in a mandate which emphasises cooperation with the target (what Abbott et al. 
refer to as ‘collaboration’).64 SPT reports and recommendations based on country visits are 
intended to inform dialogue with the target, not confrontation.  In keeping with UN practice, 
SPT findings are confidential.  However, cooperation on torture prevention confronts the 
problem of principal moral hazard, with state agencies often implicated in violations.65 Given 
the egregious nature of the crime, state goals often run counter to those of the SPT.  The 
experience of the Committee Against Torture attests to potential challenges.  Although 
empowered, subject to state cooperation, to conduct confidential inquiries into allegations of 
systematic torture, the CAT has carried out only eight such inquiries.66 Between 2007 and 
2013, the SPT conducted nineteen country visits, with just ten states consenting to the 
resulting report being made public.  Although the SPT conducts its work in ‘a spirit of 
cooperation’ with state authorities, cooperation has its limits. 
 
As such, the SPT has motive to engage in orchestration activities.  What of the means and 
opportunity?  As noted above, the SPT forms part of a novel dual-level architecture and is 
expected to steward system-wide coordination.  This is most visible in its formal linkages to 
National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs).  While this relationship is formalised in the 
OPCAT architecture and displays shades of delegation, in practice, the SPT has few, if any, 
instruments with which to directly control the NPM.  As such, the efficacy of the arrangement 
relies largely on goal convergence between both SPT and NPM. 67  SPT incentives to 
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orchestrate are in part functional, a reflection of its own capability deficits.  The 
subcommittee has struggled with a budget which does not reflect the cost of its visitation 
mandate, coupled with no allocation for NPM-support activities.68 Most significantly, the NPM 
provides the SPT with an additional lever to enhance the legitimate authority of the OPCAT 
architecture, as well as consistency in application of standards at the local level.  It also 
offers a conduit to engage in orchestration activities with other torture prevention actors, 
including civil society and the media.  Civil society has appealed to the SPT to be more 
assertive in using its political leverage, especially with regard to designation and 
strengthening of NPMs.69  
 
Enhancing informal spaces for dialogue with civil society and potential sub-intermediaries is 
important if the SPT is to establish a stable orchestration arrangement.  The inaccessibility of 
confidential Geneva-based SPT sessions has been criticised.  In terms of advancing 
compliance, public scrutiny of SPT decision-making by third parties may be vital to 
constructing a base for collective political action against often powerful opposing domestic 
forces, and to ensure local ownership of governance rule systems at the societal level.  
Emergent efforts in this direction are apparent, with greater transparency on in-country 
mission schedules and SPT meetings.  Notably, the SPT has also recently launched a 
Special Fund to help finance local implementation of its recommendations.  States, NPMs 
and other sub-state actors and NGOs are eligible to apply for funding ‘if the proposed 
projects are to be implemented in cooperation with eligible States parties and/or NPMs’.70 
The SPT convenes an OPCAT Contact Group comprising eleven organisations with global 
expertise and presence in the field of torture prevention.71 Grassroots organisations and 
NPMs are, however, absent from this network.  One observer notes that: 
 
‘In the final [OPCAT] text, the role of the Subcommittee is projected as being that of 
general oversight, exercising something of a paternalistic interest in the operation 
and functioning of the [NPMs]’. 
 
The SPT membership has shown itself willing to make modest moves away from a 
‘paternalistic’ mode of governance towards a more horizontal and deliberative decision-
making model conducive to system-wide orchestration.  More could be done.  Its 
performance, and the effect of the OPCAT regime on closing compliance gaps, may depend 
upon it. 
 
B. The Intermediary 
The NPM forms the second core pillar of the OPCAT architecture; the formal linkage of a 
global monitoring body with an equivalent domestic structure.  The legal coupling of global 
and domestic mirror structures described here is a significant departure from treaty law 
precedent, with NPMs offering a gateway for installing rule systems across jurisdictions.  It is 
important to note that states are required to ‘maintain, designate or establish’ an NPM within 
one year of OPCAT ratification and therefore do not necessarily need to create a new 
structure.72 Thus far, fifty-two (seventy-two percent) of state parties to the Protocol have 
                                                 
68
 The annual budget for servicing all ten treaty bodies in 2012 was near $56 million. 
69
 “It is high time to explode the myth that the SPT should only interact with NPMs and States parties 
through formal in-country missions”. Mark Thompson, APT Secretary General.  Quoted in APT, The 
Global Forum on the OPCAT (Versoix: APT, 2012), 28. 
69
 Abbott et al. International Organizations as Orchestrators, Ch. 1. 
70
 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/SpecialFund2014.aspx (Accessed 29 June 
2014) 
71
 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/OPCATContactGroup.aspx (Accessed 29 
June 2014). 
72
 Article 17, OPCAT 
  
14 
 
designated an NPM.73 Of those fifty-two NPMs, the majority are pre-existing standalone 
ombudsmen and national human rights institutions (NHRIs) offices.74 A minority of states 
have established multi-institution NPMs75 or purpose-built new mechanisms.76  
 
NPMs possess a range of governance capabilities at the domestic level which make them 
desirable intermediaries.  They draw legitimacy from their standing as a national-level state 
body codified in law.  Their role in receiving individual complaints, monitoring domestic 
torture prevention and follow-up with SPT recommendations is of particular note.77 NPMs 
also have direct access to the target constituency: government officials.  Such access may 
yield actionable information for the SPT when seeking to engage pro-compliance sub-state 
actors or, conversely, bypass obstructive veto players.  In sum, an effective NPM may 
enhance the SPT’s ability to not only advance compliance with torture prevention standards, 
but also advance compliance through the socialization of domestic actors.  For their part, 
orchestration with the SPT offers NPMs access material and ideational resources. 
Endorsement by the SPT may yield significant domestic benefits, legitimising the activities of 
the NPM, encouraging sub-intermediary orchestration, and elevating the NHRI as a national 
focal actor.   
 
Although generally lacking enforcement powers, many NPMs are vested with significant 
protection prerogatives, including legal petition powers, ex officio powers of investigation, 
and the ability to censure uncooperative state officials.  OPCAT obliges a series of NPM 
operational features, including provisions on unrestricted access to all places of detention, 
subpoena powers, and engagement with the SPT.78 NPMs can also engage in awareness-
raising and promotional activities, including advising on legislation, media interventions and 
joint-campaigns with local stakeholders, serving as both venues and agents for mobilization.  
This stands in stark contrast to the confidentiality and impartiality restrictions imposed upon 
the work of the SPT.  The task for the SPT and other torture prevention stakeholders is how 
to ensure that NPMs are actually enabled to fulfil their mandate. 
 
A central concern is independence.  Given their location in domestic political processes, 
NPMs are highly sensitive to the exercise of power within domestic political systems.  Article 
18 of OPCAT obliges states to guarantee the ‘functional independence’ of the NPM.  States 
are further directed to the Paris Principles – UN endorsed guidelines on NHRI 
independence, including a prohibition on government representation.79 Resistance to the 
NPM proposal during OPCAT largely stemmed from doubts over the efficacy of national 
institutions.80 NPMs are an example of dual delegation, deriving authority from their formal 
designation by both state and IGO structures.  However, dual delegation does not equate to 
parity of principal control.  Notably, a number of SPT members are also members of NPMs 
with potentially important implications for governance relationships within this dual 
delegation arrangement.81 A key challenge for the NPM therefore reflects a unique situation 
within the OPCAT architecture: how to balance independence with accountability to multiple 
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sites of authority (IGO, state and civil society).  This is readily apparent in highly political 
processes of NPM designation, with many subject to protracted delays. The SPT has begun 
to take a more concerted interest in domestic NPM establishment processes, publicising 
best practice.82 
 
Orchestration theory provides a valuable toolkit for disaggregating governance domains and 
establishing the conditions under which diverse actors will orchestrate action as an adaptive 
response to their strategic environments.  However, what can it tell us about the outcome of 
orchestration efforts?  As this discussion highlights, torture prevention agents (IGOs, NPMs, 
and other PCAs) have varying degrees of freedom to pursue their governance objectives.  In 
some circumstances, the principal (states) may also credibility commit to the global 
governance programme.  In many instances this is not the case.  The powerful intervening 
effects of domestic political contestation are implicit in the notion of bypassing the principal 
via an intermediary.  There is always a politics to institutional outcomes, with variable 
degrees of contestation at different scales of governance.   
 
A focus on goal convergence across political units along governance chains as proposed by 
orchestration theory is highly instructive.  Focusing on goal convergence between 
orchestrator and intermediary, we can construct a set of four orchestration outcomes (Figure 
2).  As such, orchestration theory provides for alternative outcomes. A pending task is to 
explicitly theorise the observed deviation from the linear model.  When are we more likely to 
observe cascade, reverse or competitive orchestration?  Even where a simple model of 
orchestration takes hold, what is the effect of this governance configuration on closing the 
compliance gap?  NPMs may engage in a range of socialization activities (training of state 
officials, educational campaigns, agenda-setting for instance), but under what conditions 
would we expect such activities to actually generate compliance?  A theoretically-informed 
literature in comparative politics offers some clues as to where answers to such questions 
may lie.83 
 
Figure 2: A four-fold typology of orchestration outcomes84 
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Figure 2 provides a framework to begin to probe the implications of orchestration 
arrangements for understanding the actual efficacy of global governance programmes.  The 
OPCAT regime is a particularly instructive domain, given its unusually formalised multi-level 
governance rule system as well as its emphasis on goal convergence among key political 
units.  Simple orchestration conforms to the formal linear prediction of the model, with the 
NPM serving as intermediary to the SPT and the OPCAT implementation programme.  
Simple orchestration relies upon goal convergence between the Orchestrator and 
Intermediary, with the Orchestrator exercising no hierarchical control. The NPM also serves 
to mediate the deep governance level along a governance chain extending from the SPT to 
the sub-local level (Model B, Figure 1).  This dispersal of delegated authority from an IGO to 
a national mechanism can empower the NPM to assume an orchestrator role in its own right.  
Indeed, NPMs are generally exhorted to be ‘a leader’ in torture prevention.85  
 
Voluntary participation of NPMs and other PCAs is predicated on the material and ideational 
support of the SPT.  However, in practice this may not be sufficient to ensure goal 
convergence.  Ensuring mutual benefit is therefore central to the orchestration equilibrium.  
Absent mutual benefit in a resource finite-environment, the SPT and NPM may conceivably 
enter a situation of competitive orchestration whereby both vie for resources (both material 
and political capital).  As noted above, however, political contestation is implicit in the 
orchestration enterprise.  This is particularly likely to be the case at the domestic level where 
compliance efforts often confront powerful institutional, political and social counter-
pressures.  In turn, intermediaries and other local actors are responsive to different political 
stimuli, and may pursue agendas independent of the OPCAT rule system.  This does not 
necessarily presuppose goal divergence and orchestration failure, but it does complicate the 
linear relational model and indicate potential changes in the causal direction of the 
governance chain. 
 
However, it is also conceivable that an orchestration arrangement could result in a complete 
reversal of the causal chain.  The intermediary role of an NPM is conditional upon the 
complicated task of establishing working relationships with diverse actors within and outside 
state structures.  NPMs are vulnerable to government capture, especially where torture 
violations implicate powerful state officials. Such an outcome is a threat to the efficacy of the 
OPCAT regime, with intermediary preferences aligning with the target to influence the IGO – 
in, effect, a reverse-orchestration.  Evidence points to some national institutions successfully 
protecting human rights, with others having effectively undermined them on behalf of 
government.86 Observers concur that individual leadership is crucial.  As a former UN special 
procedure comments: “With a mandate like torture, it goes to the very heart of the regime.  A 
[national institution] that feels at all insecure is unlikely to raise its voice on these issues”.87 
Importantly, such an outcome does not necessarily spell the end of the formal orchestration 
arrangement.  In a worst case scenario, the target is able to evade and deflect scrutiny 
through effective management of the orchestrator by proxy.  In this instance, an 
orchestration arrangement may persist despite impeding domestic compliance with the 
OPCAT rule system. 
 
Inclusion within the formalised OPCAT architecture may offer NPMs additional insulation 
from political interference.  However, the ability of the SPT to intervene on dubious NPM 
selection processes is complicated by a commitment to collaboration rather than 
condemnation.88 Condemnatory duties may therefore fall upon other stakeholders within civil 
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society.  Civil society has played a prominent role in the development of the OPCAT project, 
although it does not feature prominently in the OPCAT text. The presence of sub-
intermediaries as depicted in Model B may be a crucial and under-specified corollary to the 
efficacy of the OPCAT regime.  The impact of national level political contestation among 
competing social forces upon the efficacy of global governance programmes requires explicit 
theorising, a task which exceeds the explanatory scope of orchestration theory as it is 
currently conceived.  This auxiliary support from NGOs and other societal actors is likely to 
be particularly important in contexts where formal compliance remains partial and OPCAT 
standards are subject to contestation.  They can serve as powerful interlocutors in 
translating the OPCAT basic operational norms into local ‘vernacular’.89 In a scenario of 
cascade orchestration as depicted in Figure 2, motivated local stakeholders not formally 
integrated into the OPCAT architecture may nevertheless advance goals consistent with its 
rule system, but absent formalised relations with the orchestrator. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The notion of architecture provides a valuable way into identifying not only what is actually 
global in global human rights governance, but also how the global is connected to the local.  
Exploring the Optional Protocol has demonstrated how imprinting a global governance rule 
system in both structure and governance relationships can begin to bridge the steps which 
separate international instruments from practices on the ground.  This study highlights the 
articulation of a global human rights architecture in substantive obligations, as well as, and 
most radically, a series of procedural mechanisms which underpin a novel two-tier 
implementation apparatus.  However, as this study explores, the existence of an 
orchestration arrangement does not necessarily translate into an effective mode of 
governance.  The OPCAT architecture aspires to globality, even if many states are still to 
ratify the instrument.  Not only does it assume structural form above the level of the nation 
state, political units within the architecture display significant autonomy and power and there 
is significant unbundling of functions among interacting actors across levels.   
 
This article has sought to highlight opportunity spaces for purposive action within the OPCAT 
architecture.  Orchestration theory as developed by Abbott and colleagues has served to 
frame the OPCAT strategic environment.  Descriptively, orchestration serves to clearly 
specify governance actors, with particular attention to questions of their location, focality, 
authority and resources.  Analytically, it asserts agency and process as important corollaries 
to structural explanations for governance outcomes.  It identifies new authorising structures 
not only within IGO settings, but also extending to domestic political systems.  Different from 
orthodox modes of governance which assume hierarchical control or the direct interface 
between principal and agent, orchestration in emphasising indirect channels of influence via 
third party intermediaries offers a useful addition to modes of human rights governance.  In 
turn, orchestration offers a unified theory of governance – one capable of engaging with both 
a transnational and domestic politics of governance beyond command and control 
relationships. 
 
Orchestration also provides a basis for advancing an explanatory agenda on the efficacy of 
global governance programmes.  As indicated in this study, a crucial condition for 
orchestration to occur is limited state control and oversight of the agent.  Clearly, this is 
particularly important in a regulatory domain such as torture prevention which displays 
severe principal moral hazard – but is also likely to be applicable to other issues areas.  The 
implication that how political units are connected to centres of state authority matters 
provides the fundamental coordinates for deepening transnational theorising around 
compliance.  State authority remains a prominent influence on the politics of compliance and 
a core consideration as the focus turns away from the articulation of formal structures to 
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questions of efficacy.  When and why do global structures matter in tilting domestic political 
contests in favour of local pro-compliance coalitions?  Orchestration allows us to hypothesis 
four possible outcomes of such an arrangement, with important implications for domestic 
compliance politics.  By specifying goal convergence and divergence between the SPT and 
NPMs, the study highlights the indeterminacy of orchestrated modes of governance and the 
potential for unintended consequences. This exploratory mapping of admittedly highly 
stylised relations will be further problematised in a follow-on empirical project on OPCAT 
implementation.  
 
The installation of formal structures at the domestic level carries the promise of imprinting 
global standards onto domestic practice.  However, function often does not follow form.  This 
is a realm not simply of interlocking structure to use the rationalist parlance, but also 
governance relationships.  Goal convergence and preference ordering – both ideational and 
material – and the ability of steward actors to generate broad based consensus around a 
global governance programme is likely to be crucial to the stability, durability, and 
performance of the OPCAT architecture.  In other words, global governance as process 
requires careful attention to actors’ motives, not only means and opportunity.  But perhaps 
the crucial question turns on explaining how these actors actually operate in practice and 
when and why they matter for compliance politics.  Some observers have concluded that the 
inter-state legal human rights system is in terminal decline, declaring ‘the endtimes of human 
rights’.90 However, viewed from another vantage point, such claims may under-estimate the 
distributional power implications, especially once these structures are articulated into 
domestic politics. 
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